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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent disputes have become increasingly complicated and drawn out,
and commentators and practitioners have grappled with various public and
private solutions to the problem. Numerous changes have been made to the
patent regulatory system and litigation process. Moreover, many companies
have tried various alternatives to the traditional judicial system, such as
arbitration, mini-trials and mediation. None of these efforts have
completely satisfied private industry, however, and several companies have
suggested that they might do better dealing with patent disputes on their
own-without the help of courts or traditional alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) techniques.
This Article sets forth a proposal for an industry-sponsored National
Patent Board (NPB) to resolve patent infringement disputes. Part II briefly
describes current patent regulation and the problems associated with
traditional litigation and the most common methods of ADR. Part III
compares the proposed NPB to the National Advertising Division (NAD) of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus and the National Advertising
Review Board (NARB). 1 Part IV discusses the structural design of the
NPB. Part V highlights the procedural design of the NPB. Part VI
concludes with some overall thoughts regarding the NPB.
* The authors would like to thank Patrick Lane and The Procter & Gamble
Company for allowing the authors the opportunity to critique the proposed National
Patent Board. The authors would also like to thank Lyn Collins of the National
Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus for information on that
organization.
1 The NAD and the NARB are highly successful in dealing with advertising
disputes, and the proposed structure for the NPB is based largely on those
organizations. This Article considers the differences between advertising substantiation
claims and patent disputes and suggests what unique problems the NPB may face and
what successes the NPB may yield.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT LAW AND PATENT LITIGATION
Protection of intellectual property rights, particularly patent rights, has
ancient origins.2 The governments of ancient Greece and Rome granted
patents to encourage innovation and creativity. 3 This tradition continued
through the Middle Ages and was developed further within the British
system. 4 Not surprisingly then, American inventors have sought and
obtained protection for their inventions almost since the beginning of the
Republic. 5 The Constitution grants Congress the power to issue patents. 6
While this provision only provides general direction as to the scope of
protection available to inventors, it has been construed liberally in the
evolution of the patent system in the United States.7 The liberal
construction of the patent grant has played a critical role in the
development and overwhelming dominance of U.S. business in the global
economy.8
The issuance of a patent by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) confers upon the inventor a legally recognized property
interest in the patented invention, granting him the right, for a limited time,
to exclude others from making, using, selling or importing the patented
2 See, e.g., ERNEST B. IPscoMB III, LipscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:1, at 7
(3d ed. 1984).
3 See id.
4 See id. §§ 1:1-1:9.
5 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BucKLEs, IDEAS, INVENTIONs, AND PATENTS: How TO
DEvELOP AND PROTECT THEM 6 (1957); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNrrED STATES
PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CoNFLICTs IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY
13-18 (1956).
6 "The Congress shall have the power... [tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7 For a thorough review of the history of the U.S. patent system, see, e.g.,
LIPSCOMB, supra note 2, at 57; Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 673, 674-678 (1989).
8 See, e.g., National Patent Planning Commission, FIRST REPORT 783-784 (1943);
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent
System, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 555, 555 (1951). See generally GORDON C. BJORK,
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC INTEREsT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
CAPITALsM (1969).
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invention in the United States.9 The basic requisites for patentability under
U.S. law are utility, novelty and nonobviousness.10 Further, the applicant
for a patent must be the original inventor,11 must file within a limited time
frame so as to avoid "statutory bars," 12 must adequately disclose the
invention in the "specification" of the application 13 and must distinctly
claim the invention.14
There are three types of patents available from the PTO: utility, design
and plant patents. Utility patents are granted for a period of twenty years
from the date of filing for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof." 15 Design patents are awarded for a period of
fourteen years for "any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture."1 6 Plant patents are granted seventeen years of protection
for "any distinct and new variety of plant." 17 Although the scope of
patentable subject matter as limited by the above prerequisites is relatively
narrow, it has been expanding in recent years, leading to controversy and
uncertainty among inventors, business owners and the judiciary.' 8
The Patent Act19 provides broad legal remedies for protection of patent
owners against violations, known as infringements, of their rights to
exclusivity.20 In addition, patent owners can seek declaratory judgments in
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
10 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994). See generally HmERT F. SCHWARTZ,
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 43-56 (Federal Judicial Center 1988).
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994).
12 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (d) (1994).
13 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1994).
14 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 64.
15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
16 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
17 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
18 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that a process
incorporating a computer is patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a live, man-made microbe is patentable as a composition
of matter).
19 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-296 (1994).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) (providing that a patent owner "shall have remedy
by civil action for infringement of his patent"). The remedies available to the patent
owner upon a judgment of infringement include preliminary or permanent injunctive
relief and compensatory damages that are no less than a reasonable royalty. See 35
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federal courts to establish their legal rights and responsibilities. 21 The
determination of whether infringement has occurred turns on whether
someone (1) without a valid license (2) makes, uses or sells (3) the patented
invention (4) within the U.S. or its territories (5) during the term of the
patent. 22 When infringement is alleged, four general questions must be
resolved: patent validity, patent enforceability, the existence and extent of
infringement and the available and appropriate relief for the patentee or the
alleged infringer. 23
The resolution of the above questions-which being based on cutting-
edge technology are usually extremely technical and complex-must take
place at trial in the federal courts.24 However, the federal court system is
generally inefficient at resolving complex disputes. 25 The complexity of the
often highly technical issues involved in patent cases frequently exacerbates
the inherent inefficiency of the federal courts. 26 The main deficiencies of
U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (1994). Moreover, a court can increase the damages award up to
three-fold if it finds appropriate circumstances, such as willful infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1994). The court can also award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in "exceptional cases." See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
21 See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994) (providing that
actions for Declaratory Judgment are governed by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states "[tihe existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude
a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.").
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
23 See David W. Plant, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PATENT LITIGATION
1993, at 197, 239 (PLI: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 376, 1993).
24 The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement
disputes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
25 This inefficiency has been recognized at the highest levels. In an oft-quoted
speech, then-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said:
[Resolution of disputes by adversarial litigation] is a mistake that must be
corrected .... For some disputes, trials will be the only means, but for many
claims, trials by the adversarial contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial
by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, [and]
too inefficient for a truly civilized people.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Mid-Year Meeting of ABA, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471
(U.S. Feb. 28, 1984).
26 See Tom Arnold, Fundamentals of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why Prefer
ADR, in PATENT LmGATION 1993, supra note 23, at 355, 661.
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federal patent litigation noted by commentators include inordinate time for
resolution, excessive costs, lack of qualifications of the decisionmaker, the
potential loss of trade secrets, public embarrassment, lack of finality and
the loss of positive business relations.27 Although the problems also occur
in federal litigation involving other subject matters, they are particularly
prevalent in patent litigation.
The owner of a patent can only exercise his right of exclusion over the
patented subject matter for a limited period of time, namely twenty years
from the application filing date. 28 Thus, patents are "wasting assets" that
steadily decline in value with the passage of time. The average patent
litigation takes more than five years to resolve. 29 However, many cases
take much longer, with some lasting more than twenty years. 30 Thus, it is
foreseeable that having received a patent grant, an owner could be
completely deprived of the value of the patent due to protracted litigation.
However, it is the uncertainty over the ultimate length of litigation that
perhaps may be more detrimental to business than the actual length of the
litigation. 31 In today's fast-paced business climate, predictability is more
important than ever. Business owners need to know whether to make
27 See generally TOM ARNOLD Er AL., PATENT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
HANDBOOK § 5 (1991).
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
29 See Arnold, supra note 26, at 660.
30 See Tom Arnold, Why Prefer ADR, in PATENT LIMGATION 1996, at 245, 248
(PLI: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Library Property Course Handbook Series
No. 457, 1996).
I had one case working for 27 years. 5 remands to the trial court. 5 petitions for
writ of certiorari. A simple one patent case on a simple oil well drill bit. Budgeted
in the currency of when the case started back in 1953, at $50,000 and two years, it
cost tens of millions of dollars and 27 years-a dispute resolution horror story
from the courts.
Id.
31 See Arnold, supra note 26, at 660.
[The acute time problem is not only time delay, but the fact that the time it [patent
litigation] takes cannot be reliably estimated within plus or minus two years-Two
years which is often critical to business planning-Whether to license or not and if
so at what royalty-Whether to build the new plant or not-Whether to continue
an accused infringement you think is lawful, but that is accumulating potential
damages at the rate of a million dollars per month.
Id.
465
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capital investments in production and distribution facilities and whether to
continue production of a potentially infringing product when such
production could result in significant damages. These business issues
cannot wait for litigation to be resolved. 32
The nature of patent infringement litigation contributes significantly to
the delays found in the federal system. The factual underpinnings of even
the simplest patent infringement cases involve technical issues that are
beyond the grasp of most people, including judges and jury members. 33
Even the most progressive district courts are hard pressed to deal with the
avalanche of technical information that supports each side in their quest to
uphold or impugn patent validity and enforceability or to demonstrate or
deny infringement of the claims of a patent. 34 When that information
involves technically advanced or complex technologies, as it usually does in
patent litigation, even counsel for the parties, much less the judge or jury,
will find comprehension difficult. 35
32 See ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 27, § 5.03. In certain areas of technology, such
as information systems, computer science and communications, the advances in the
technology are so rapid that even a two- or three-year wait for a decision in patent
litigation could render the result moot. See Karl P. Kilb, Arbitration of Patent Disputes:
An Important Option in the Age of Information Technology, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA ENT. L.J. 599, 611 (1993).
33 See ARNOLD, supra note 27, § 5.02 (most judges do not have technical expertise
or familiarity with patent law, and typically only spend between 0.01% to 2.0% of their
time dealing with patent litigation); Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and
Patent Law, 3 FED. Cmzcurr B.J. 1, 1 (1993). Of course, the inability of judges and
juries to comprehend modem scientific evidence is not limited to patent litigation. See
generally Developments in the Law, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1481 (1995); Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court:
Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 54 LAw & CONrEMP. PROBs. 171
(1991).
34 See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593-594 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("Such issues involve complex and difficult questions in applying an extremely technical
body of law."); see also General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co. Inc., 497
F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1974) ("This patent appeal is another illustration of the
absurdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges whose knowledge
of the relevant technology derives primarily, or even solely, from explanations by
counsel and who.., do not have access to a scientifically knowledgeable staff.").
35 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Mll. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 331 (1971) (" [Platent litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds,
without appropriate grounding in science and technology, may have difficulty in
reaching decision."); Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir. 1965)
466
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The crowding of the federal dockets also contributes to the often
prolonged delays in patent litigation.36 The number of civil cases has
increased more than seven-fold since 1938. 37 Federal district court dockets
are also increasingly consumed by criminal trial proceedings that cannot be
delayed due to "speedy trial" considerations. 38 Thus, patent suits are often
postponed for months or even years.39 Moreover, more patent infringement
suits are being filed than ever before. 40 Perhaps even more significantly,
the adversarial process promotes, and sometimes requires, that the parties
engage in prolonged (and expensive) pretrial discovery.41 Parties engage in
numerous depositions, production requests, motions practice and appeals.
Of course, it may also be in the interest of either party to delay the
resolution of the case indefinitely, and there is little an opponent can do to
("The court below in recognition of its avowed limitations, rested its decision basically
on its evaluation of the relative credibility of opposing expert witnesses."); Harries v.
Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 1950) ("Congress sees fit to set
before us tasks which are so much beyond our powers... that we shall resort to the
testimony of experts .... ."); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
36 See Casey, supra note 33, at 4.
37 See ARNOLD, supra note 27, § 1.02.
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2) (1994) (requiring the federal district court to
bring the defendant to trial within 70 days of the filing of an indictment or information
by the government).
39 See ARNOLD, supra note 27, § 1.02.
40 Patent infringement actions have increased steadily in recent years, with the
number of patent cases up 6.8% to 1840 in 1996 and up nearly 25% over 1992. See
ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMImsTRATiVE OFFICE OF Tim UNrrD
STATES COuRTs (1996).
41 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 33, at 1; Kenneth B. Clark & William A. Fenwick,
Structuring an Arbitration Agreement for High Technology Disputes, 9 COMPuTER LAW.
22, 24 (1992) ("Pretrial discovery is often the largest component of litigation cost.");
Michele Galen, Guilty!, Bus. WK., April 13, 1992, at 60, 64 (arguing that 80% of all
legal fees are incurred during discovery); David W. Platt, ADR and Patents, in PATENT
LMGATION 1992, at 797 (PLI: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 350, 1992)) (asserting that preparing for trial can typically
cost more than one million dollars); Report from the President's Council on
Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (August 1991), reprinted
in 60 U. CN. L. REv. 979, 981 (1992) (stating that "[o]ver 80% of the time and cost of
a typical lawsuit involves pretrial examination of facts through discovery").
467
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speed things along. 42 Many commentators have suggested that ADR
mechanisms could assist in cutting discovery costs and delays,43 but even
those mechanisms have significant drawbacks. 44
Conventional adversarial litigation, particularly patent litigation, is also
extremely expensive. 45 It is estimated by many commentators that a typical
patent infringement suit costs a minimum of $500,000 to litigate.46 These
costs are for the most part out of the control of a party. 47 Per-party costs
average over one million dollars per side. Many cases cost between two
and five million dollars. 48 In the most extreme case, the parties spent
42 See Bruce B. Brtnda, Resolution of Patent Disputes by Non-Litigation
Procedures, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 73, 82 (1987).
43 See, e.g., William H. Erickson, Limited Discovery and the Use of Alternative
Procedures for Dispute Resolution, 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 303 (1994).
44 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, 14 CAL. LAw. 53 (1994)
(discussing the cost-related problems of arbitration and mediation discovery referees).
45 See generally Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments:
Hearings H.521 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 166, 168, 172 (1980)
(statement of D.R. Dunner, President, American Patent Law Assoc.); id. at 592-593
(statement of S.A. Diamond, then-Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks); id. at 645-
646 (statement of H.F. Manbeck, Jr., General Patent Counsel, General Electric Corp.);
id. at 697 (statement of R.B. Benson, Counsel, Allis-Chalmers Corp.); Brian T. Foley,
Catch A Ride on the "Rocket Docket," CONN. L. TRmuNE (Intellectual Property
Supp.), Oct. 7, 1996, at 4 ("It is commonly known that patent litigation is among the
most costly species of litigation."); Thomas McCarroll, Creativity-Whose Bright
Idea?, TImm, June 10, 1991, at 45 (describing the "soaring cost of patent litigation" as
ranging as high as $250,000 to $2 million); Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent
Laws Be Abolished?, 11 J. CONTEM. L. 389 (1985) (citing litigation costs as one
reason to consider abolishing patent laws).
46 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 26, at 662; Casey, supra note 33, at 4; Platt,
supra note 41, at 797-798. This is to be compared with the average cost in 1968 of
$50,000 per case. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
335 (1971).
47 See Arnold, supra note 26, at 661 ("[T]hirty percent of the cost [of litigation] is
in the control of the judge [and] [t]hirty percent is in the control of adverse counsel.").
48 See American Intellectual Property Law Association, Committee on Economics
of Legal Practice, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURvEY 1995 (1996). The survey examined
the total cost of a patent infringement suit from filing to final adjudication, including all
fees, court costs and other expenses. The analysis was conducted for four different
ranges of amount at risk-from less than $1 million to more than $100 million. A
plurality of the cases, 46%, fell into the $1 million to $10 million range. The median
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almost $200 million combined. 49 In another recent case involving litigation
over patents directed toward the anti-HIV compound AZT, the judge
concluded that the parties were spending upwards of $100,000 per day on
the litigation, not including the court costs. 50 As mentioned above, a large
proportion of litigation costs are incurred during discovery. 51
As the value of patent rights has risen to the fore of American business
consciousness, 52 efforts to protect and enforce those rights have become
more intense. 53 The vigor with which suits to enforce patent rights are
brought, combined with the technical complexity of the issues presented in
such cases, has led to prolonged, difficult and expensive litigation, as noted
legal cost for such litigation was about $1 million, while in the $10 million to $100
million range, the median cost was about $1.5 million.
49 See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828 (D. Mass. 1986),
aff'd, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
50 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (E.D.N.C.
1993), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The sixty-year-old courtroom in New Bern, North Carolina, has been converted
into a contemporary "high tech" facility utilizing "real time" court reporting and
six computer-integrated video display monitors. It is highly conceivable that the
cost of this trial for the parties exceeds $100,000 per day, in addition to the time
and expense associated with this court and the jury. As this case enters its fourth
week of trial, the parties estimate, somewhat conservatively the court suspects, that
the trial will last an additional six to eight weeks ....
Id.
51 See Platt, supra note 41, at 798.
52 See, e.g., McCarroll, supra note 45, at 44 (recognizing that inadequate
protection of intellectual property costs United States' economy approximately $80
billion in sales each year).
53 The damages awards in recent patent infringement cases seem to provide
justification for such vigor. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1711, 1714 (D. Mass. 1991) (awarding a judgment of $873,158,971);
Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. 229 U.S.P.Q. 81 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (awarding a
judgment of $204 million); Pfizer Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q.
586 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (awarding a judgment of $55,800,000). See generally Nancy J.
Perry, The Surprising New Power of Patents, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 57. Indeed,
patent litigation has become so lucrative that syndications have sprung up offering to
finance plaintiffs for a share in the damages awards. See, e.g., Daniel A. DeVito &
Peter Szendro, Legal Entrepreneurs in the Patent World, MANAGIG INTELLE AL
PROPERTY, May 1996, at 12-13; Linda Himelstein, Investors Wanted-for Lawsuits,
Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 78.
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above. This trend has not gone unnoticed by either Congress or the
judiciary. Several decades ago, Congress recognized that patent cases
present unique difficulties and require an inordinate length of time to
resolve.54 In 1970, the Supreme Court also took notice of the problem.55
However, although it must have recognized the problems presented by
patent litigation, the federal judiciary rejected early attempts by parties to
avoid litigation and pursue ADR mechanisms such as arbitration. 56
More recently, the Supreme Court issued two decisions that seem to
increase pressures on the already overburdened federal judiciary.57 In
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that
the "construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is
exclusively within the province of the court." 58 Similarly, in Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., the Supreme Court adopted an
element-by-element evaluation of equivalents test, rather than a holistic
54 See, e.g., STAFF OF TH= SuBcommrrrE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
CoPYRIGHS, SENATE CommrrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF
PATENT LIGATION STATISTICS 2 (Comm. Print 1961).
55 See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 337
n.31 (1971). The Court cited the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1970. The Court
also noted that although patent cases constituted only 1-2% of all civil cases filed in the
federal courts between 1968 and 1970, they required an inordinate amount of time.
While 90% of all other civil litigation was concluded within three days of trial, less than
half of all patent suits were concluded in such a period. Further, while less than 2% of
all civil non-jury trials required 10 or more days to conclude, almost 20% of patent
trials required such time periods, and patent cases accounted for more than 20% of the
civil cases requiring more than 20 days to resolve. The Court also noted that in contrast
to other types of civil cases, the trend in patent litigation was toward longer trials.
56 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (noting "the
important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain" to support the challenge of invalid
patents); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63
(7th Cir. 1970) (stating that "[patent validity] questions are inappropriate for arbitration
proceedings and should be decided by a court of law, given the great public interest in
challenging invalid patents"); Homewood Industries, Inc. v. Caldwell, 360 F. Supp.
1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (rejecting private initiatives to resolve a patent dispute).
57 See generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
58 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
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approach test.59 One commentator noted that these new responsibilities
thrusted upon the federal judiciary will be resented, especially in light of
the already complex and slow-moving patent disputes before it.6°
Nevertheless, the expansion in scope of patentable subject matter, the
overwhelming importance of protection of intellectual property rights to
U.S. industry and business and the complexity, of patent litigation led to
congressional efforts in the 1980s to foster alternative methods for dealing
with disputes over patent rights. 61 Accordingly, in 1982, Congress enacted
35 U.S.C. § 294 to provide for judicial recognition and enforcement of
voluntary arbitration agreements. 62 In 1984, Congress further expanded the
role of ADR for patent disputes. First, the Patent Law Amendments Act of
1984 broadened the definition of what constitutes an "interference" 63 and
consequently encouraged the use of arbitration to resolve this type of
dispute. 64 Second, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 198465
59 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
60 See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century: Maximize
Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton
Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADmLARK OFF. Soc'y 499, 503 (1997).
61 See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2, 13. Congress
recognized that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as voluntary arbitration
would "enhance the patent system... [,]promote innovation" and "relieve some of the
burden on the overworked Federal courts." Id.62 President Reagan signed Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988)) on August 27, 1982. This section provides that
contracts involving patents may include arbitration provisions pertaining to patent rights
that will be enforced in federal courts, that such arbitration is governed by Title 9 of the
United States Code, that arbitration awards may be binding on the parties (but not on
others) but can be modified if the underlying patent is found invalid and that arbitration
awards will be enforceable once notice of such an award is given to the Commissioner
of Patents. See id. For a general review of the history behind § 294, see MANBECK,
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION OF PATENT DISPUTEs-THE BACKGROUND TO 35 U.S.C. §
294, 268 (1988).63 An interference is a dispute between two or more applicants for patents on the
same claimed subject matter. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C.
§ 135(a) (1988).
64 See id. Section 135(d) already provided for arbitration of interferences. See id.
§ 135(d). Thus, the expansion of the scope of what constitutes an interference
effectively broadened the availability of arbitration.
65 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-904 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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provided for alternative dispute resolution of royalty payment disputes for
innocent infringement of chip-product rights. 66
As Congress has recognized, ADR mechanisms for patent disputes are
not limited to arbitration. The types of resolution mechanisms available can
be fairly divided into three categories: nonbinding private procedures,
including negotiation, mediation, mini-trials and summary jury trials;
binding private procedures such as arbitration; and court-annexed
procedures including court-ordered arbitration and the appointment of
special masters.
Because of the recognized drawbacks of traditional patent litigation, at
least one commentator has suggested that litigation is on its way out:
The new wisdom is don't litigate-cooperate. Turn your blockbuster patent
into an industrial standard, let everyone take a license, share your
technology and pocket the money. This is a simple formula, but one which
does not include patent infringement. The old-style patent litigation is
under threat and has become increasingly unfashionable. If it is to survive,
it must either adapt or must become a protected species. There is no doubt
as to which course clients will prefer. 67
The nonbinding private ADR procedures do not award results which
are enforceable judgments with res judicata and collateral estoppel effect.
In mediation, parties hire a mediator and establish the governing ground
rules. 68 Typically, mediation exposes the strengths and weaknesses of each
party's case. 69 A problem specific to mediation is the mediocre mediator's
aim to garner a settlement, irrespective of the strengths and weaknesses of
either party's case. 70 This problem can be detrimental to the holder of a
patent or conversely to the challenger of a patent.
66 See id. § 907. Section 907(a) provides for liability by innocent infringers only
for reasonable royalties. Section 907(b) as amended provides that the amount of the
royalty may be resolved by voluntary negotiation, mediation or binding arbitration. See
id.
67 Jeremy Phillips, The Demise of Old-Style Patent Litigation, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP., June 1996, at 2.
68 See Beverly B. Goodwin & Laurence H. Pretty, How to Handle Litigation of a
Patent-Part I, in PATENT LITIGATION 1992, at 205, 224 (PLI: Patents, Copyrights,
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In mini-trials, the parties agree to the entire procedure and can include
all issues or only partial issues in contention. 71 Each side presents its
evidence to a neutral advisor and then meets to discuss the neutral advisor's
overall outlook on the case.72 In summary jury trials, the same process as a
mini-trial occurs, except juries are utilized.73 Following the presentation of
evidence and witnesses, the jury issues a decision. 74 These three forms of
ADR require parties to narrow the scope of their arguments and objectively
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. 75 However, these
ADR procedures also delay trial if not managed properly. Such a delay,
due to the existing backlog of cases, can be devastating to both parties in a
dispute. 76
The binding procedures do award results which are enforceable
judgments with res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. 77 The problem
with these binding ADR procedures is that parties cannot present all of
their arguments and evidence in accordance with the established rules of
civil procedure and evidence.78 Instead, the parties must deal with the
admission of evidence that would have been excluded in a traditional court
proceeding. In addition, arbitration awards usually contain minimal
findings of fact or conclusions of law and so parties must be satisfied with a
blanket award. 79 Finally, these ADR procedures are binding, thus
precluding a party from challenging the award in court. 80
As noted, these traditional forms of ADR still suffer from significant
drawbacks. Most notable among these is the lack of arbitrators and
mediators with sufficient technical expertise in technology and patent law to
provide quality judgments in a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost.
A comprehensive five-year study of federal district courts using ADR
procedures by the RAND's Institute for Civil Justice revealed some
surprising and sobering results. First, ADR programs had little effect on
71 See id. at 223.
72 See id.




77 See id. at 223.
78 See id. at 226.
79 See id.
80 See id.
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time to disposition, litigation costs, attorneys' satisfaction or views of the
fairness of case management. 8' Second, other case management procedures
had no major effects on cost and delay. 82 Third, when delays were
shortened, lawyers still did the same amount of work, as well as other tasks
related to judicial management.8 3 Finally, participants felt that ADR
meetings were conducted before parties were ready to settle.84 Because
patent disputes are so complex and winner-take-all oriented, these
weaknesses of current ADR methods make those procedures unappealing to
the patent holder and patent challenger. When coupled with the delays and
cost of traditional litigation, patent holders and patent challengers are in a
lose-lose situation. Therefore, a new form of ADR is required.
Ill. A COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL PATENT BOARD
WITH OTHER PRIVATE COURT SYSTEMS
The problems associated with litigation and court-sponsored ADR have
prompted some industries to develop their own procedural mechanisms for
resolving industry-specific disputes. The most successful examples of such
industry-initiated dispute resolution mechanisms are the National
Advertising Review Board (NARB) and the National Advertising Division
(NAD) of the Council of. Better Business Bureaus. The NARB and the
NAD were established in 1971 in response to complaints brought when
consumer advocate Ralph Nader and the American Bar Association (ABA)
began criticizing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).8 5 The FTC also
began to encourage comparative ads, and there was a need for a forum to
evaluate substantiation claims.8 6 The NAD and the NARB's founders, the
American Advertising Federation, the American Association of Advertising
Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers and the Council of Better
Business Bureaus, hoped to find an industry-initiated solution to a growing
81 See RAND INsTrruTE FOR CrIviL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INExPENSIVE?:
AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CJRA 1 (1996).
82 See id. at 20.
83 See id. at 21.
84 See id. at 20.
85 See Jones, The National Advertising Review Board Experiment in Self
Regulation, in CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 832, 832-834 (1975).
86 See Felix H. Kent, Control of Ads by the Private Sector, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 27,
1985, at 1.
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public disenchantment with advertisers.87 The founders also wanted a
system that was speedy, easily accessible in case of a problem and
consistent in its decisions.88
The NAD's and the NARB's goals are to "promote and foster the
highest ethical relationship between businesses and the public through
voluntary self-regulation, consumer and business education, and service
excellence." 8 9 More specifically, the NAD and the NARB provide a forum
for evaluating the truth and accuracy of national advertising90 and a
platform to develop a set of guidelines for advertisers. The NAD handles
initial proceedings while the NARB reviews appeals.
The structure of the proposed NPB is based directly on those of the
NAD and the NARB. 91 The proponents of the NPB are attempting to
address problems similar to those facing advertisers. Patent holders have
become frustrated with the courts and traditional methods of ADR. The
NPB is envisioned as an industry-run mechanism that will produce
decisions as good or better than parties would expect from ADR or the
courts, while utilizing a process that is quicker than is usually available in
traditional forums. 92 As with the NAD and the NARB, the NPB is designed
to issue predictable decisions that parties will perceive as fair. 93 The
Board's goal is to become the forum of choice for most patent infringement
cases, thus freeing up courts and resulting in a low relitigation rate. 94
87 See Norman Gottlieb, NAD/NARB-A Voluntary Approach to Abuses in
Comparative Advertising, 64 TRDEMARK REP. 498, 499 (1974).
88 See Janice Handler, The Self-Regulatory System-An Advertiser's Viewpoint, 37
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 257, 257-263 (1982).
89 Eric J. Zanot, The National Advertising Review Board, 1971-1976, in
JOURNALIsM MONOGRAPHS 3, 13-16 (Bruce H. Westley ed., 1979).
90 The NAD holds itself responsible for "receiving or initiating, evaluating,
investigating, analyzing, and holding initial negotiations with an advertiser on
complaints or questions from any source involving the truth or efficacy of national
advertising, or consistency with [the Children's Advertising Review Unit's (CARU)]
Self Regulatory Guidelines for Children's Advertising." Debra Goldstein, Industry Self-
Regulation of Advertising National Advertising Division of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus, Inc. Cases, Trends and Outlook for the Future, 954 PLI/CoEP. 19,
43 (1996).
91 See Interview with Patrick Lane, Associate General Counsel-Patent Litigation,
The Procter & Gamble Company (Oct. 1996).
92 See Appendix infra at Preamble.
93 See id.
94 See id.
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The NPB differs from the NAD and the NARB primarily because of
the respective nature of the disputes brought before them. Because disputes
brought before the NAD and the NARB usually involve the truthfulness of
claims made in advertising, NAD/NARB proceedings typically revolve
around discrete factual resolution and do not require significant legal
expertise. 95 NPB proceedings, however, will involve highly technical
subject matters and complex factual and legal issues.96
The nature of patent disputes as compared to advertising disputes will
also affect public perception of the NPB. Although one of the NAD and the
NARB's goals is to resolve disputes between corporations, the
organizations' ultimate goal is to protect the public interest by exposing
false advertising claims. 97 Conversely, the NPB, is primarily directed to
protecting and to advancing industry interests and challenges. The average
consumer has little knowledge of the patent system, and patent disputes
rarely directly affect public safety or buying habits. While the NAD and the
NARB address broad-based issues concerning the public welfare, the NPB
is largely a mechanism for resolving disputes within participating groups,
including industry, universities and small inventors. 98
IV. THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL PATENT
BOARD
A. Creation, Membership, Management Structure and Funding
To bolster credibility, the NAD and the NARB were created with the
intention that they would be "completely autonomous and independent" of
95 See Charles Shafer, Developing Rational Standards for an Advertising
Substantiation Policy, 55 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1986) (discussing problems associated
with substantiation claims).
96 See ARNOLD, supra note 27, § 5.02; Casey, supra note 33, at 1.
97 For examples of how advertising relates to the public welfare, see Patricia
Auferheide, Reregulating Children's TV, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 87 (1989); Dee Pridge,
How Will Consumers be Protected on the Information Superhighway, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 237 (1997).
98 See, e.g., Michael P. Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory
Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (1992) (discussing
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other persons and organizations." The organizations initially won praise
for including all parties involved in advertising-companies, advertising
agencies and the general public. 1°° Similarly, the NPB has adopted a "start
from scratch" approach.101
Both the NARB and the NAD have clearly delineated management
structures. The National Advertising Review Council (NARC) is the
governing body of the NARB. The NARC's board of directors elects a
chairperson and admits members of the NARB. The body is also
responsible for establishing rules and procedures for the NARB and for its
general management. An executive director runs day-to-day affairs,
prepares periodic reports of the NARB's activities and interfaces with the
NAD and other organizations. The efforts of the director are supported by
a small staff that handles administrative details such as scheduling hearings.
The NAD and the NARB are funded solely by the Better Business Bureaus,
which in turn receive funding from local members. As a result, no one
party exerts inordinate financial control over the organization.10 2
The NPB will have much of the same composition. A board of
directors elected by the members will establish policy, by-laws and
procedural rules. 103 The board will select administrative management and
perform peer review of proposed panelists. 104 An executive director will be
responsible for routine management of the organization, determining
ripeness, recruitment of panelists and checking for conflicts of interest. 0 5
NPB members will pay dues and contribute staff (usually patent
attorneys). 106 User fees will cover costs associated with ripeness
determinations and hearings.107
While the NARB and the NAD claim to represent the general public,
they are nevertheless beholden to their corporate members. The NARB
membership, for example, consists of forty advertisers, twenty advertising
99 Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
10 See Jones, supra note 85, at 832-834.
101 See Appendix infra at I.
102 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
103 See Appendix infra at m1.
104 See id.
105 See id. at IV.
106 See id. at VII.
107 See id.
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agencies and ten members of the general public. 108 Since their inception,
the NAD and the NARB have been criticized for being pro-business and for
deciding cases from the point-of-view of an advertiser.1 09 The NPB's
membership will be open to all patent owners, generally, which should
eliminate the criticism launched at the NAD and the NARB. 110 Because the
NPB will be funded by annual member dues and user fees, any bias
allegations will be dependent upon the makeup of the membership.
However, the NPB's policy of repaying any capital contribution is a wise
public policy decision, since it defeats any claim that the NPB is a
corporate tool of big business.111
B. Hearing Panels
The NAD employs attorneys with experience in fields such as
advertising, trade regulation, litigation and arbitration. The NAD has no
formal panel review system and sees itself as more of a general
investigative body. 112 NARB panels are made up of one member from an
advertising agency, three members from corporate advertisers and one
member from the general public. NARB panelists are not required to be
attorneys. Panelists must disqualify themselves if they anticipate a conflict
of interest with any party or any matter before the Board. A complainant
and an advertiser each have the right to challenge the qualifications of any
panel member and to request a replacement member. 113
The NPB is not intended to be an investigative body, and there will be
no appeal mechanism. 114 As a result, the NPB panels are modeled after
those at the NARB and will include three patent attorneys from an
108 See Better Business Bureau, Better Business Bureau Advertising Review
Programs: The National Advertising Division 5 (visited Feb. 20, 1998)
<http://www.bbb.org/advertising/nadproc.html#2.1 >.
109 See Jones, supra note 85, at 832-834.
110 See Appendix infra at II.
111 See id. at VII.
112 See Better Business Bureau, Better Business Bureau Advertising Review
Programs: The National Advertising Division 17 (visited Feb. 20, 1998)
<http://www.bbb.org/advertising/adproc.html#2.1 >.
113 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
114 See Appendix infra at XXXIII.
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED NATIONAL PATENT BOARD
approved list of panelists.115 Unlike the NARB, which has no formal
qualification requirement, all NPB panelists must be admitted to practice
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office and must be
approved by the NPB Board.'1 6 This requirement will insure that the
panelists understand the complexities of patent law, one of the major
criticisms of the federal judiciary. Like the NARB, NPB panels are
intended to arbitrate disputes with impartiality, and panelists must recuse
themselves if there is any conflict of interest." 7 The smaller size of the
NPB panels will likely 'be an improvement over the NARB panels, as
experts in the field of ADR contend that smaller arbitration panels are more
efficient than larger ones.1 8
The NPB will face more criticism than the NAD and the NARB
concerning the impartiality of panel members. The NAD has a professional
staff of investigators who have no real affiliation with NARB members.
Thus, all initial factual findings are made by what is considered to be an
impartial board. The NARB, which could be viewed as being more captive
to advertiser interests, only has the power to review findings of the NAD.
In contrast, if the NPB's membership consists of mostly large corporations,
the NPB will be the primary and final arbiter of all disputes, and panel
membership will be dominated by representatives of large corporations." 9
As long as panelists remain impartial and disputes are primarily between
businesses, the NPB may have no problem. However, as more proceedings
are brought by individuals, a danger exists that the NPB will be viewed as
serving the interests of its corporate members. As a result, the NPB should
make membership affordable and worthwhile to all patent holders and
potential patent challengers.
115 See id. at VI.
116 See id. at XLIX.
117 See id. at VI.
118 See AMRoLD, supra note 27, § 7.07.
119 See Appendix infra at m.
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V. THE PROCEDURAL DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL PATENT
BOARD
A. Initiation of Proceedings
The NAD acts in response to complaints by individual consumers,
advertisers, Better Business Bureaus, trade associations or other groups.
Local Better Business Bureaus are responsible for handling regional
advertising complaints, but many complaints are referred to the NAD
because they involve national advertising. Competing businesses are
important sources of NAD cases, and the NAD itself conducts systematic
monitoring of national broadcast, cable television and print advertising. In
recent years, 20% of NAD cases have originated from consumers, 50%
from competing advertisers and 30% from the NAD's monitoring
program. 120 The NAD is an alternative to litigation or action by the FTC.
Individuals are not precluded from using those resources, but a person may
not pursue concurrent actions before the NAD and another body. 121
As with the NAD, any member will be able to submit a claim before
the NPB against any other member. Members of the NPB must defend
actions in front of the forum. All participants must agree in advance to be
bound by NPB rules.122 Parties may seek temporary restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions while an action is pending before the NPB, but they
may not initiate full-scale litigation.123
The breakdown of who initiates proceedings is likely to differ greatly
between the NAD and the NPB. The NPB will initiate no proceedings on
its own, and large corporations will likely dominate early proceedings. 124
The attractiveness of the NPB to noncorporate members will depend on
whether the Board is seen as accessible to the general public (i.e., small
patent holders) and is viewed as being nonbiased. This perception will
depend largely on whether the aforementioned concerns are addressed by
the NPB.
120 See Better Business Bureau, Better Business Bureau Advertising Review
Programs: The National Advertising Division 30 (visited Feb. 20, 1998)
< http://www.bbb.org/advertising/nadproe.html#2.1 >.
121 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
122 See Appendix infra at XIV.
123 See id. at X.
124 See id.
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B. Ripeness Determinations and Notification
For the NAD to consider a complaint, the advertising matter must be
national in character, currently active, concern primarily the truth and
accuracy of statements made and must not be overly technical. For matters
initiated internally, the General Counsel to the NARB has final say as to
whether to bring a claim. The NAD encourages confidentiality and often
will not handle a case that has been brought to the attention of a third party
(such as the media). The NAD always notifies the advertiser of the identity
of the complainant, and an advertiser has fifteen days to respond. The
complainant may submit a reply to the NAD within ten days of receiving
the response.125
Similar to an NAD proceeding, the party initiating the action before the
NPB must submit a formal complaint. The executive director of the NPB
will make the sole determination as to whether to allow an action. 126 The
director will determine whether there is a "bona fide issue at stake." 127
Factors that will influence this decision include whether the complainant is
acting on his own behalf and whether he is planning to make, use or sell
the product in question.' 28 The level of review is intended to be less
stringent than that for a declaratory judgment action. Decisions by the
executive director are nonappealable and strictly confidential. 129 If a bona
fide issue is deemed not to exist, the patentee will not be notified. 130 If a
bona fide issue does -exist, the patentee will be given thirty days to
respond.' 31 All counter-claims must be brought in a separate action. 132
The NAD has been criticized for being arbitrary with respect to the
types of complaints it accepts for review. In 1972, the Consumer
Federation of America analyzed thirty-four complaints brought before the
NAD, of which twelve were rejected. 133 The NAD is supposed to put itself
125 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.






132 See id. at XXV.
133 See Jones, supra note 85, at 834.
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in the place of the consumer when deciding whether to accept a case; 134
however, the Consumer Federation found that there was no coherent
standard used for review. 135 Similarly, the NPB may face some criticism of
its pre-clearance decisions because the executive director is not required to
give any rationale for his decision. In order to eliminate these concerns, the
NPB should include a forum where a rejected party can apply for
reconsideration.
C. Inclusion of Other Interested Members
The only parties included in an NAD proceeding are the advertiser, the
complainant and the NAD review panel. No other entities are permitted
access to or participation in the proceedings. 136 In contrast, the NPB will
notify all members of current proceedings and will give them an
opportunity to intervene subject to approval by the executive director. 137
Members who decline to participate will be bound by claim construction in
the future.' 38
There is less of a need to include additional parties in an advertising
proceeding because the main issue at hand is usually the validity of a single
manufacturer's ad. The NAD, by acting for the public good, obviates the
need for additional complainants to be present. In the patent context,
however, there may be multiple parties infringing the same product-many
of whom are unknown at the time of the complaint. By alerting all
members of a pending action and binding them by claim construction if
they do not attend, there is a greater likelihood that interested parties will
present themselves at one hearing. 139 This device will eliminate stale claims
and potentially redundant hearings.
134 See Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1985).
135 See Jones, supra note 85, at 832-834.
136 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
137 See Appendix infra at XXXII.
138 See id. at XXII.
139 See id. at XXXII.
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D. The Hearing
The NAD and the NARB do not have rigid procedural rules. The NAD
investigation is informal and is not intended to be antagonistic or
adversarial. The NAD proceedings are conducted in complete confidence,
and the NAD obtains assurances from the parties that any information used
in the inquiry will only be provided to persons directly involved in the
proceeding. Any information that the complainant desires the NAD to
consider must also be submitted to the advertiser. The advertiser can
request that nonpublic information given to the NAD not be made available
to the complainant. 140 An NARB panel hearing consists of a presentation
by the NAD followed by remarks by the advertiser and challenger. Subject
to prior approval by the NAD, the panel will accommodate any party that
has requested an opportunity to appear and offer testimony. All parties
must answer questions posed by panel members. 141
NPB procedures will be much more adversarial. Each party must be
represented by an attorney who submits a formal brief summarizing
arguments to be made at the hearing.142 There is limited discovery, and the
alleged infringer is required to give the patentee product samples. 143 If one
party intends to rely on documents at the hearing, it must submit all
relevant data and supporting documents to the other party. 144
The hearing itself will be held at NPB headquarters. Prior to the
commencement of the hearing, the panel will identify key issues still in
question and will state its inclination as to how it would rule based on the
briefs. 145 Each party will open with a formal statement. 146 The scope of the
arguments will be limited to materials in the briefs, although the panel may
consider arguments made in other forums such as in the PTO and in a
judicial hearing. 147 The party with the burden of proof on an issue will
140 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
141 See Better Business Bureau, The National Advertising Review Board (visited
Nov. 10, 1997) <http://www.bbb.org/advertising/narb.html>.
142 See Appendix infra at XLV.
143 See id. at XXXVII.
144ee id. at XXXVIII.
145 See id. at XVIII.
146 See id. at XLI.
147 See id.
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have the first and last opportunity to address that issue. 148 No witness
testimony will be allowed, but demonstrative evidence can be used.149 The
panel will question the parties, and no ex parte communication will be
allowed. 150 The patentee will be required to establish infringement by a
preponderance of the evidence. 151
E. Written Opinions
Both the NAD and the NARB issue written opinions. NAD reports
contain the parties involved, the basis of the inquiry, the issues involved,
the facts and data presented and the conclusions reached. NARB decisions
are similar and may also include concurring and dissenting opinions. NAD
findings are supposed to be limited to the truth and accuracy of a particular
ad, and decisions should be consistent with the BBB Code of Advertising1 52
and the Children Advertising Review Unit's Self Regulatory Guidelines for
Children's Advertising. NAD opinions are published ten times a year in
NAD case reports.153
The NPB will also issue written opinions. 154 The opinions will
designate the prevailing party, describe how the panel construed the claim
and material legal and factual bases for the decision, and, when necessary,
will include a dissenting opinion. 155 The NPB panel will be required to base
its decisions on current federal patent law. 156 The panel may take into
account prior art and will be permitted to adopt a view different from that
presented by either party. The NPB panel may not make a finding of
willfulness or suggest information regarding non-infringing alternatives or
design arounds.157
148 See id. at XXXV.
149 See id. at XLI.
150 See id. at XLVI.
151 See id. at XXXV.
152 See Better Business Bureau, BBB Code of Advertising (visited Nov. 8, 1997)
<http:lwww.bbb.orgladvertisingladcode.html.l>.
153 See Zanot, supra note 89, at 13-16.
154 See Appendix infra at XXVI.
155 See id.
156 See id. at XVII.
157 See id. at XXI, XXVIII.
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The NAD and NPB opinions will differ significantly in their content.
The NAD report is essentially a finding of fact. The panel assesses whether
ad claims can be substantiated given the evidence provided by the parties.
Although the panel relies on formal guidelines, little formal legal precedent
guides its decisions. The NPB, conversely, in addition to fact-finding on
infringement claims, makes decisions as a matter of law. NAD opinions
have been criticized for being too vague, and commentators have had a
difficult time defining the issue at hand in decisions, much less the basis for
the panel's finding. 158 NPB opinions may escape some of this criticism
because of their expected reliance on legal precedent.
F. Effect of Decisions
Ten days after publication of an NAD decision, a complainant, an
advertiser or the NAD may request that the NARB review a case. After the
NAD has responded to the appealing party's request and prepared a case
record, the appealing party has ten days to submit a letter to the NARB. If
the NAD does not receive a satisfactory response from an advertiser, either
changing or withdrawing an offending ad, the NAD may report the
advertiser to the appropriate regulatory agency (usually the FTC).
As mentioned above, there will be no appeals taken from NPB
decisions. 159 If a decision is in favor of an alleged infringer, a patentee will
have thirty days to accept the finding and waive any infringement claim.160
If the patentee reserves the right to sue despite the panel's finding, it will
be required to pay the NPB fees incurred by the alleged infringer. 161 If
there is litigation in which the patentee does not improve its position, the
patentee will also be required to pay the legal fees incurred by the alleged
infringer. 162 If the panel's decision is in favor of the patentee, the alleged
infringer may accept the decision and drop production, use or sale of the
infringing product, or exercise its right to sue.163 In the latter case, the
alleged infringer will risk having to pay the panel fees of the patentee or its
158 See Best, supra note 134, at 6-7.
159 See Appendix infra at XXXIII.
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legal fees if the court does not reach findings materially different from
those of the panel. 164
The NAD relies largely on public sentiment to ensure compliance with
its decisions. Virtually all ads brought before the Division are substantiated,
modified or withdrawn. Appeals are infrequent. 165 The NAD finds that the
public exposure surrounding the outcome of its review process is sufficient
to coerce most advertisers to take action to remedy any substantiation
difficulties. The Division rarely has to refer measures to the FTC.
However, it is questionable whether the weight of public pressure will
produce similar compliance with NPB decisions. The general public shows
little concern for patent disputes.166 The legal community is likely to have a
somewhat cynical view of NPB findings knowing that parties can always
resort to litigation regardless of the panel's decisioni. The award of
attorney's fees is the only penalty that may play some significant role in
convincing a party to abide by the NPB's decision. However, the fee-
shifting likely will not deter parties from filing suit and likely will only be a
motivation for settlement negotiations should litigation become protracted
or have an uncertain outcome.
VI. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PROPOSED NATIONAL
PATENT BOARD
The proponents of the NPB have similar ideas to those of the founders
of the NAD and the NARB-they seek a speedy, less costly, more efficient
alternative to traditional litigation and ADR. To this end, the NAD and the
NARB have largely been successful. The organizations have clearly-
164 See id.
165 See Best, supra note 134, at 13.
166 One scholar has conducted a light-hearted history of the portrayal of lawyers in
media and found:
As an accurate picture of lawyers and their day-to-day existence, [television
dramas in the 1960s] fell short. Needless to say, legal work is hardly as heroic, as
exciting, or even as helpful to society as these dramas portrayed. I would like to
see such a lawyer "in more natural circumstances," one critic complained at the
time. "How would he do at a title search, or at a long-drawn-out closing? Has he
ever had any experience in patent law?"
Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the
Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MLAim L. REv. 229, 255-256 (1987).
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defined organizational structures that quickly react to complaints and
industry concerns. Although large organizations dominate the membership
and panels of the NAD and the NARB, the general public is nevertheless
given a significant voice in the running of the two bodies. NAD findings
have been criticized for being too vague and generally pro-business, but
advertisers have, for the most part, complied with its decisions. The NPB
likely will achieve similar success to that of the NAD and the NARB in
regard to its general reaction time to disputes and likely will exceed the
performances of those bodies in regard to the clarity of its decisions.
However, because of the nature of patent disputes, the NPB will face
several unique problems. First, there is some uncertainty as to the
accessibility or relevancy of the NPB to those outside the corporate realm.
Because the NPB membership will not include the general public, and
because patent holders form a small, select group of individuals, the NPB
will not enjoy the broad recognition and attention focused on the NAD.
Founding corporations will be the only parties at early proceedings. The
makeup of the NPB and its target audience may change over time, but it is
difficult to foresee the shape these changes will take.
The NPB can make itself more accessible to non-members and
individual patent holders by making sure that large corporations do not
dominate the organization. The NPB should consider imitating the NARB
by admitting members of the general public. The board should find
alternate forms of funding so that it is not overly dependent on the support
of its founders. Finally, the NPB could hire its own staff of patent attorneys
instead of relying on its members for staff.
Second, although confidentiality is an important issue in NAD
proceedings, it will be critical in disputes before the NPB. The NAD is
concerned with privacy primarily to protect the image of advertisers. There
is no confidentiality concern with the subject matter of NAD disputes, as
advertising is by definition already in the public domain. However, the
voluntary participation of corporate advertisers depends on some measure
of protection from frivolous claims, and an assurance that substantiation
disputes, while brought to the public's attention, will not become a
spectacle.
While these concerns also apply to claims that will be brought before
the NPB, patent holders are more concerned with preserving trade secrets
and not prejudicing their position should a dispute go to trial.
Manufacturers do not wish to divulge sensitive information, especially early
in the design process of a product. Furthermore, patent disputes have
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traditionally involved much more protracted litigation than advertising
claims.
The NPB faces a difficult task in providing dispute resolution while
avoiding becoming a conduit for the disclosure of otherwise non-
discoverable information subsequent to traditional judicial proceedings. The
success and credibility of the NPB as a dispute resolution mechanism
requires that it publish detailed reports of its findings in order to establish
precedent and to explicate its reasoning. To that end, participants should
provide enough information for credible findings to be made. However, the
organization must guard against parties becoming overly concerned that
information provided to the Board later will be misused. The NPB probably
would want to err on the side of not publishing or not requiring the
disclosure of too much information in order to encourage open participation
by all parties in its proceedings. The NPB also should institute strong
sanctions against parties determined to be using proprietary information
divulged at an NPB hearing for wrongful purposes.
Lastly, no one can predict what impact the Patent Reform Act will have
on intellectual property disputes. The Act may stave off litigation by
informing parties at a much earlier stage of potential patent infringements.
However, the Act also may promote litigation by encouraging parties to
wage patent warfare before a patent has even been granted. .The proponents
of the NPB should monitor the effects of the Reform Act closely and be
willing to modify the structure of the organization to meet industry needs.
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APPENDIX
NATIONAL PATENT BOARD (NPB)
A PRIVATE PATENT COURT
The following outlines issues involved in creating a new forum for
resolving patent disputes, a recommended solution for most issues and the
rationale for each recommendation. NPB's goals are:
(1) Qualit: decisions perceived as equal or superior to ADR/court;
process perceived as fair and predictable
(2) Sp : quicker than ADR/court; provide time to avoid infringement
and make meaningful decisions about product design yet avoid undue delay
if the need arises to go to court
(3) Cost: less expensive than ADRlcourt
(4) Participation: high usage; become primary forum for patent matters;
free up courts for patent cases that need to be tried
(5) Compliance: respect for decisions reflected by infrequent post-NPB
litigation
I. CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT BODY
RECOMMENDATION: A new entity should be created called the
National Patent Board (NPB).
RATIONALE: Creating a new entity provides independence from any
individual industry, trade association or corporate member. NPB must not
only be recognized as a just and authoritative entity, but also must be
distinguished from existing ADR.
H. NPB MEMBERSHIP
RECOMMENDATION: NPB membership should be open to patent
owners.
OPEN QUESTIQN: Whether non-patent owners with sufficient nexus
(e.g., law firms and insurers which issue policies under which they may be
obligated to defend and/or indemnify a party) should be permitted to join.
I. MANAGING AUTHORITY
RECOMMENDATION: There should be an NPB Board of Directors
elected by NPB members. The Board would: establish overall policy, by-
laws and procedural rules for hearings; select and supervise NPB's
administrative management; perform regular peer review on panelists; form
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standing committees on membership, funding, hearing procedures and
panelist review.
RATIONALE: NPB members should take an active role in NPB's
management to ensure that it meets its goals. The Board should be
democratically elected to ensure that it is not dominated by any member or
group and assure that NPB is responsive to member needs.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
RECOMMENDATION: Day-to-day management of NPB should be
handled by a full-time Executive Director supported by a small staff to
handle administrative details such as scheduling hearings, etc.
RATKQNALE: NPB members are more valuable serving on the Board
(and possibly on hearing panels) than attending to administrative details
which are better handled by professional management.
V. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
OPEN QUESTIJON: Whether NPB should be affiliated with an
existing, reputable organization (e.g., CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution). Prospective NPB members are existing members of such
organizations. Affiliating with such an organization may enable NPB to be
formed more quickly, have broader membership and draw upon the
collective experience of that organization.
VI. HEARING PANELS
RECOMMENDATION: Each hearing panel should be made up of
three patent attorneys. Only high quality, experienced patent attorneys
should be selected for NPB panels. It is not a prerequisite that a panelist be
trained in the technology at issue, but it is preferable that at least one
panelist have experience in administrative hearings. There should be strict
conflict of interest rules, and panelists should be prohibited from
conducting any independent investigation of a matter.
RATIONALE: It is superior to have multiple panelists so they can
discuss issues in reaching a decision. Parties are be more likely to accept a
3-0 decision rather than one person's view. Conflict of interest rules are
necessary to ensure NPB's integrity. Prohibiting panelists from conducting
independent research or investigation will ensure that matters are decided
based upon the briefs and the hearing. While panelists may be trained in the
discipline at issue, it is not necessary in order to obtain an informed
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determination of patent issues, and NPB panels would have superior patent
experience to non-NPB forums.
OPEN QUESTION: Whether all panelists should be full time NPB
employees or whether some should be drawn on an ad hoc basis from
outside counsel and the patent staffs of NPB members. [If NPB members
provide panelists, they must meet the established qualifications to serve on
panels. The number of panelists that a member is required to supply
annually should be limited and be determined by the size of the member's
patent staff. Panelists employed by NPB members should not be
compensated for their time but should have all expenses reimbursed by
NPB (with those amounts becoming hearing costs). If a member does not
have a patent staff, it should pay higher dues to compensate for the need to
use the staff of other members or non-NPB attorneys. If NPB members
fulfill their annual obligation to supply panelists and additional hearings
arise for which panelists are needed, NPB members may either voluntarily
provide personnel or allow panels to be made up of additional full time
employees or outside counsel. Having NPB panelists will ensure that NPB
members take matters seriously and that decisions reflect "real world"
considerations.]
VII. FUNDING
RECOMMENDATION: NPB should be funded by annual member
dues to be determined by the Board. There should also be "user fees" to
cover costs associated with hearings. If founding NPB members made
capital contributions to finance the formation of NPB, the Board should
repay those contributions over time. Each party should pay its own fees and
costs (absent a subsequent fee/cost shift).
RATIONALE: Fixed operating costs (salaries and office overhead)
should be paid out of annual dues. Variable costs should be paid with user
fees. NPB is not intended to be a profit-making organization, and dues/fees
should be set to minimize assessments. Repaying capital contributions of
founding NPB members assures that all members are on equal footing.
VIII. PRIVATE v. PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: NPB proceedings should be private. Neither
non-party NPB members nor the public should be permitted to attend
hearings or have access to materials used in the proceedings.
RATIONALE: This is a private, voluntary system. There is no
constitutional obligation to open proceedings to the public. Confidential and
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trade secret information will be disclosed during proceedings. Disclosing
such information to the public and non-party NPB members may do
competitive damage to the parties and may discourage use of NPB.
IX. BINDING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: NPB decisions should be non-binding
(although parties should have the option to make the decision binding).
RATIONALE: NPB proceedings do not provide full, traditional
procedural protections to which parties are accustomed in litigation, so they
may perceive binding proceedings as unfair. The goal and expectation,
though, is that the vast majority of decisions will be respected.
X. INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION and RATIONALE: The initiating party is
never obligated to use NPB instead of litigation; it always retains the right
to go to court, including seeking a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Because NPB may not be suitable for all patent disputes, the initiating party
should retain the right to go to court or use ADR.
NPB should not be permitted to initiate proceedings on its own. NPB's
purpose is to resolve disputes. It is reactive, not proactive. It is not charged
with responsibility for independently uncovering or investigating possible
instances of patent infringement.
OPEN QUESTION: Whether non-NPB members should be permitted
to participate in NPB proceedings (whether as an initiating or responding
party).
XI. AVOIDING THE NPB PROCESS
RECOMMENDATION: A respondent-infringer or patentee may avoid
a hearing if it agrees that there is no issue.
-RATIONALE: If the parties agree that there is no issue, there is no
reason to have an NPB hearing.
XII. WAIVER OF HEARING
RECOMMENDATION: If all parties agree, a panel may decide a
matter upon written submissions and without a hearing.
RATIONALE: If the parties agree that a hearing is unnecessary and
that they want their dispute resolved written submissions (whether for
reasons of cost or otherwise), NPB should permit this.
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XIII. USE OF NPB PROCESS
OPEN QUESTION: Whether an NPB member is required to participate
and complete the proceeding before initiating litigation.
XIV. ENFORCEMENT OF NPB RULES
RECOMMENDATION: All NPB participants must agree in advance to
be bound by NPB rules.
RATIONALE: While the results of NPB proceedings are non-binding,
certain undertakings in NPB proceedings require binding commitments
such as protecting the confidentiality of information, adherence to
timetables, etc.
XV. RIPENESS DETERMINATIONS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be a ripeness determination
procedure. Only those issues deemed to be ripe should be heard by NPB.
The standard for initiating an NPB proceeding should be lower than for a
declaratory judgment, i.e., there need not be a "case or controversy" or an
allegation of infringement. However, a party may not seek an advisory
opinion from NPB. The standard to be developed should balance the
competing interests of preventing litigation through early hearings and
diminishing patent protection with advisory opinions. The standard should
not be based on the likelihood of infringement, but whether a bona fide
issue exists based upon the status of the prospective infringer's product
developmental process and its demonstrated commitment to that process.
In order to initiate a ripeness proceeding, the initiating party should be
required to represent to NPB's Executive Director that it believes there
may be a bona fide issue with respect to an identified U.S. patent, that it is
acting on its own behalf and that it provide evidence that it is planning to
make, have made, use or sell the product. The ripeness determination
should be conducted ex parte by the Executive Director and is not
appealable. If the Executive Director determines that no bona fide issue
exists, the patentee should not be advised of this determination. If the
Executive Director determines that a bona fide issue does exist, that
determination and the identity of the initiating party should be promptly
reported to the patentee. The patentee should then have 30 days to initiate
an NPB proceeding or agree that there is no issue of infringement
regarding that embodiment.
RATIONALE: It is difficult to halt or modify product plans after a
party invests substantial time and money. The key is to address the issue
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before significant time and money is invested so that any change can be
readily made. The Executive Director is responsible for screening out
hypothetical or non-ripe cases. Most importantly, the current lack of such a
mechanism short of declaratory judgment causes lawsuits that NPB can
prevent. A party that is confident it does not infringe does not need such a
proceeding, but this provides a safety net/reality check for other parties
before they pass the point where product modifications can easily and
inexpensively be made.
XVI. DAMAGES
OPEN QUESTION: Whether hearings should consider issues of
damages or only if both parties stipulate.
XVII. APPLICABLE LAW
RECOMMENDATION: NPB panels must apply statutory and
substantive law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Panels may rely upon decisions
from Federal District Courts.
RATIONALE: Allowing NPB to create substantive patent law would
only inject unpredictability, just the opposite of the goal. Supreme Court
and CAFC decisions establish binding legal principles. Decisions of lower
courts are not binding, so the weight they are accorded should remain
within the discretion of the panel.
XVIII. ISSUE DEFINITION
RECOMMENDATION: The initiating party should identify the patent
claims that it believes are at issue. If a respondent-patentee believes that the
product infringes additional patent claims and/or additional patents, it
should promptly add them to the hearing. If the parties agree that it will
take additional time to address such issues, they may stipulate to extend the
hearing. If the parties are unable to agree, it should be within the discretion
of the Executive Director to extend the hearing.
RATIONALE: NPB's goal is to bring clarity at an early stage, so it
should resolve all patent issues surrounding a product.
Xix. MULTIPLE EMBODIMENTS
RECOMMENDATION and RATIONALE: If multiple embodiments
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If participation in NPB proceedings is mandatory and a party later
makes another embodiment which presents a bona fide infringement issue
with respect to the same patent, it may not initiate another NPB proceeding
regarding that product for at least 30 days after the decision in the first
hearing. NPB's goal is to resolve issues while preserving the status quo
regarding litigation options available to the parties. It is important to
prevent abuse of NPB (especially if members are required to forego
litigation during the' pendency of NPB proceedings). This avoids having a
patentee involuntarily drawn into sequential NPB hearings on a stream of
products and being precluded from going to court ("well, if that infringed
[did not infringe] how about this?"). The patentee should have the option of
engaging in subsequent NPB proceedings or pursuing litigation.
XX. INFRINGEMENT ISSUES
RECOMMENDATION: The panel should decide issues of literal
infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
RATIONALE: Infringement issues are well suited for summary
adjudication without extensive discovery.
XXI. WILLFULNESS ISSUES
RECOMMENDATION: The panel should not decide whether any
infringement was willful.
RATIONALE: Willfulness issues require an investigation into counsel's
opinions and their competence which is tangential to NPB's purpose.
XXII. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
RECOMMENDATION: The panel should decide claim construction
issues.
. RATIONALE: An essential element of infringement is claim
construction, and indeed claim construction often resolves many
infringement questions. Under Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116
S. Ct. 1384 (1996), claim construction is to be decided by the court as a
matter of law, so it is well suited for such proceedings.
The claim construction process may lead the panel to examine the prior
art in determining the scope of presumptively valid claims, examine issues
of prosecution history estoppel and address a "practicing the prior art" non-
infringement defense.
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XXII. VALIDITY ISSUES
OPEN QUESTION: Whether panels should decide validity issues or
only if all parties stipulate. If validity is considered, NPB must address
concerns that hearings may put the patent at risk.
XXIV. ENFORCEABILITY ISSUES
RECOMMENDATION: The panel should not decide enforceability
issues unless all parties stipulate.
RATIONALE: Enforceability issues normally require discovery to
explore materiality and intent, so such issues are better suited for the courts
or ADR. It may put the patent at risk which the patentee may be reluctant
to do. It is better to forego enforceability determinations and secure higher
participation than to include enforceability determinations, crowd a short
hearing with additional issues and risk the opportunity to resolve
meaningful infringement and claim construction issues.
XXV. COUNTERCLAIMS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be no counterclaims.
RATIONALE: If a party has a patent infringement counterclaim
unrelated to the product at issue, it can initiate a separate NPB proceeding.
Non-patent counterclaims are too far afield.
XXVI. WRITTEN OPINIONS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be a written opinion identifying:
(1) the prevailing party; (2) the claim construction; and (3) all material
legal and factual bases for the decision.
RATIONALE: For NPB to be successful, its decisions must be
respected. "Up or down" decisions do not accomplish that nor do they give
the parties guidance for avoiding future disputes which is an essential
benefit of NPB.
XXVH. DISSENTING OPINIONS
RECOMMENDATION: There may be dissenting opinions.
RATIONALE: NPB proceedings are intended to provide the parties
with guidance concerning their dispute. There is no reason to deprive the
parties of a different, minority point of view.
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XXVIII. ADVISORY OPINIONS
RECOMMENDATION: No panelist or opinion should suggest non-
infringing alternatives or design-around options.
RATIONALE: NPB's purpose is not to provide consulting services but
rather to be an adjudicative body. A party should use its own resources to
investigate non-infringing designs.
XXIX. DISSEMINATION OF OPINIONS
OPN QUESTON: Whether opinions should be distributed to parties,
to NPB members or to the public.
XXX. EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
RECOMMENDATION: Neither the initiation of an NPB proceeding
nor any statement made in an NPB proceeding should form the basis for or
be relied upon regarding initiation of a declaratory judgment action.
Similarly, NPB proceedings should not be interpreted as constituting delay
or lack of irreparability in any TRO or preliminary injunction proceeding,
nor should an NPB opinion be evidence of willfulness.
RATIONALE: NPB must not distort traditional legal remedies. If NPB
proceedings could be used to justify declaratory judgment actions or to
defeat injunctive relief, it would distort the existing legal system and
discourage participation in NPB proceedings.
XXXI. POST-NPB PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: If the patentee loses an NPB hearing, it should
have 30 days within which to affirmatively state whether it: (a) accepts the
decision and waives any infringement claim regarding that embodiment; or
(b) reserves its right to sue regarding that embodiment, in which case it
must pay the NPB costs (including the user fee) incurred by the alleged
infringer. If there is subsequent litigation in which the patentee does not
improve its position, the patentee must also pay the legal fees incurred by
the alleged infringer in the NPB proceeding (subject only to the discretion
of the Executive Director to reduce the fees if they are deemed excessive).
If the accused infringer loses an NPB hearing and proceeds to make,
have made, use or sell that embodiment, it must pay the costs (including the
user fee) incurred by the patentee. If there is subsequent litigation in which
the alleged infringer does not improve its position, it must also pay the
legal fees incurred by the patentee in the NPB proceeding (subject only to
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the discretion of the Executive Director to reduce the fees if they are
deemed excessive).
RATIONALE: Parties to NPB proceedings should be given an
opportunity to decide whether to abide by the decision. There should also
be an incentive to abide by the decision. Requiring the loser to
automatically pay costs and/or fees would discourage participation.
Similarly, requiring payment of future litigation costs and/or fees would
give a party incentive to "run up the bill." This a balance between
encouraging participation and abiding by decisions.
XXXII. MULTI-PARTY PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: Multi-party proceedings should be permitted.
Once a proceeding is deemed ripe, all NPB members should be notified and
those with a bona fide basis for participating should be given the
opportunity to do so. If an NPB member declines to participate, it will be
bound by the claim construction in future NPB proceedings. Findings
regarding infringement will be of persuasive authority in any later NPB
proceeding. Multiple parties are to share time on a per side basis. In the
event that the losing party chooses not to abide by the NPB decision, it
should only be responsible for the costs and fees of the original party, not
the additional parties.
RATIONALE: There is no reason to have multiple proceedings when
one can suffice. Multiple proceedings are contrary to efficient adjudication
and business certainty.
XXXII. APPELLATE RIGHTS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be no appeals. If parties are not
motivated to reach resolution in a non-binding proceeding, an appellate
procedure is not likely to resolve the dispute. If a party feels strongly
enough about its position to appeal, it should go to court.
OPEN QUESTION: Whether a limited request for reconsideration (on
grounds such as new CAFC law) should be permitted.
XXXIV. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
OPEN QUESTION: Whether NPB should include the following
additional enforcement mechanisms: NPB should publish a report
concerning compliance with NPB decisions; NPB rules should require
parties to stipulate that: (a) they will not seek to discover or admit into
evidence in any subsequent court or ADR proceeding any of the briefs,
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submissions or other statements made during NPB proceedings; and (b) the
written opinion of the NPB panel is admissible in a subsequent court
proceeding and that no party will object or otherwise attempt to preclude
the admission of the opinion.
XXXV. BURDEN OF PROOF
RECOMMENDATION: The burden of proof in NPB proceedings
should be in accord with decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit.
Ripeness: A party seeking to initiate a proceeding bears the burden
of proving that an issue is ripe for NPB determination.
Infringement: The patentee bears the burden of proving patent
infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.
Claim Construction: Each party presents its claim construction. The
panel may adopt a claim construction that differs from that urged by any
party.
Validity: The alleged infringer bears the burden of proof of
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
Enforceability: The alleged infringer bears the burden of proof of
unenforceability by clear and convincing evidence.
RATIONALE: NPB's effectiveness depends upon its ability to supplant
litigation and/or ADR, so its rules should mirror such forums.
XXXVI. DISCOVERY
OPEN QUFMTION: Whether there should be discovery and, if so, how
much.
XXXVII. PRODUCT SAMPLES/PROCESS DEMONSTRATIONS
RECOMMENDATION: The alleged infringer should be required to
give the patentee product samples (or a process demonstration in the event
of a process claim) sufficient for the patentee to present proof of
infringement and make tests.
RATIONALE: In order to determine if infringement exists, it is often
necessary to examine and test the accused product or process. As a result,
it will be necessary for the alleged infringer to supply product samples (or
process demonstrations) early in the proceedings. It can also be very useful
to the panel to examine the accused product.
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XXXVIII. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
RECOMMENDATION: If a party intends to rely upon data or
documentary materials, it should submit them to the other party _ days
prior to its initial brief. A party submitting data and/or documents should
be under a duty of good faith to turn over all relevant data and documents
on that issue rather than just selected data and documents which support its
position.
RATIONALE: Parties cannot be permitted to play "hide the ball" on
key issues on which they present proof.
XXXIX. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
RECOMMENDATION: NPB rules should contain a confidentiality
provision applicable to the parties, the panel and all NPB personnel. It
should provide for the return or destruction of all confidential information
at a specified time at the conclusion of a proceeding. Violation of the
confidentiality agreement should be sanctionable by NPB.
RATIONALE: In order to encourage parties to participate it will be
necessary to protect their confidential information.
XL. PROCEDURAL RULES
RECOMMENDATION: There should be written rules of procedure for
NPB hearings.
RATIONALE: NPB is intended to provide predictability so the rules
should eliminate procedural uncertainty.
XLI. HEARINGS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be no witness testimony at the
hearing. All parties and their representatives should be permitted to be
present at all portions of the proceedings. The hearing should generally be
concluded in one day. The party with the burden of proof on a particular
issue should open and close with respect to that issue.
- days prior to the hearing, the panel should identify any issues of
concern to it and should indicate any inclinations on the issues. Panels may
also advise the parties if there are any matters on which the panel seeks
substantiation. If the panel seeks substantiation, the parties should submit it
no later thian days in advance of the hearing.
Attorney's arguments must be based upon matters contained in the
briefs, data or documents previously submitted. Attorneys may make
arguments based upon representations, although the panel may give them
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lesser weight within their discretion. The parties may use demonstrative
evidence submitted to the other party _ days in advance of the hearing.
The panel can consider arguments made to the PTO and EPO and other
forums about claims in issue.
RATIONALE: There is no need for live witness testimony. If issues
hinge on the credibility of witnesses, it is more likely that litigation will be
required. In order to focus the hearing and show that the panel is prepared,
it should advise the parties of the matters it considers significant so that the
parties can know in advance how to frame their arguments.
XLH. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be no transcription or other
record made of the proceedings.
RATIONALE: A record is needed only when there may be subsequent
proceedings that require knowledge of what happened. There will be no
appeal from NPB decisions, and the statements made during the
proceedings are not admissible in court or ADR. Creation of a record also
adds an unnecessary air of formality.
XLI. TIMETABLE FOR PROCEEDINGS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be a defined, expeditious,
realistic timetable for the proceedings.
RATIONALE: NPB should target for resolution in 90-120 days
(recognizing that proceedings cannot realistically be completed in under 2
months and 6 months fails to meet the goal of obtaining a ruling before a
party commits significant capital resources).
XLIV. BRIEFS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be specific limitations on the
number, length and sequence of briefs.
RATIONALE: Briefs should have ample room to address the issues and
have the parties believe that they have appropriately advised the panel of
their position. Opening briefs of 50 pages, opposition briefs of 50 pages
and reply briefs of 25 pages should be satisfactory.
XLV. PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE
RECOMMENDATION: Parties should be represented at proceedings
by attorneys.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RATIONALE: NPB hearings are intended to mirror results obtained in
court or ADR, so attorneys should represent the parties.
XLVI. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
RECOMMENDATION: There should be no ex parte communications
with NPB personnel or any panelist.
RATIONALE: Ex parte communications would deprive NPB of the
integrity necessary to have parties abide by its decisions.
XLVII. ROLE OF PANEL
RECOMMENDATION: The panel should be encouraged to ask
questions during the hearing. Questions may be answered by a party's
representative in attendance at the hearing.
RATIONALE: Questions from the panel will focus the hearing on the
decisive issues and allow the parties to fully have their "day in court" on
those issues. To the extent that attorneys may not know the answer to
questions or believe that the answer can be better stated by a party
representative, it should be permitted.
XLVIII. LOCATION FOR HEARINGS
OPEN QUESTION: Whether NPB should establish "institutional" style
headquarters or have more modest quarters (perhaps traveling to a location
selected by the parties).
XLIX. TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
RECOMMENDATION: All panelists must be admitted to practice
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office and meet minimum
qualifications established by the Board. The Board should review the
qualifications and performance of all panelists annually, and no person
should be permitted to serve without an affirmative vote of the Board by a
two-thirds majority. Panels should not retain independent experts to advise
them.
RATIONALE: Quality panelists and decisions are the key to NPB's
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L. FILE HISTORY
RECOMMENDATION: The entire U.S. file history should be
provided to the panel by the initiating party. The panel may consider any
related foreign filings. A party can rely upon anything in the public record.
RATIONALE: The panel is responsible for claim interpretation and
should have this information available in order to reach an informed
decision.
LI. SANCTIONS
RECOMMENDATION: NPB rules should provide for sanctions
including fines, increased user fees for future matters and expulsion from
NPB. Sanctions may be imposed for violation of confidentiality provisions,
for making material misrepresentations or for engaging in sham
proceedings (initiating "friendly" proceedings in order to establish a broad
claim construction or to have NPB establish the validity of claims).
Sanctions may only be imposed by the Board upon a recommendation from
the panel for matters raised prior to the opinion or the Executive Director
for matters raised after the opinion is issued.
RATIONALE: Panel opinions should reflect all material legal and
factual issues so that if a party later alleges that a misrepresentation was
made, materiality for purposes of possible sanctions can be determined
from the face of the opinion. While it is important to avoid encouraging a
Rule 11 type practice, it is equally important to prevent parties from
abusing the informality of NPB proceedings.
LH. ANTITRUST ISSUES
RECOMMENDATION and RATIONALE: There is nothing in NPB
rules or proceedings that should raise antitrust issues.
LIII. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
RECOMMENDATION and RATIONALE: NPB proceedings do not
obligate the parties to notify the PTO under either 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) or
37 C.F.R. § 1.565(a).
LIV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
RECOMMENDATION: NPB founders should prepare "legislative
history" concerning its rules and procedures.
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RATIONALE: It is inevitable that questions will arise concerning the
interpretation and implementation of different NPB provisions. Having
"legislative history" will be useful to the Board in resolving such questions.
LV. LENGTH OF TIME TO BECOME OPERATIONAL
RECOMMENDATION: NPB should become operational by July 1,
1998.
RATIONALE: It will likely take one year to build national support for
NPB and an additional year to construct the organizational framework and
put the appropriate mechanics in place.
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